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On Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience 
MULFORD Q. SIBLEY' 
University of Minnesota 
ABSTRACT-The problems of political obligation and civil disobedience have recently been re-
emphasized in the civil rights struggle, in student demonstrations of various kinds, and in direct 
act ion connected with the peace movement. At the same time, men like the late President Ken-
nedy have seemed to say that deliberate disobedience of law could never be countenanced. 
In the light of controversies such as these, the present paper explores the disquietude about 
'legitimacy of political rule in the Western political tradition; restates and evaluates several of the 
views that seek to give an account of political obligation; and formulates a possible way of view-
ing obligation and the conditions under which civil disobedience might be both a right and a 
duty. No historical political system, the paper argues, has ever been completely legitimate, so 
that under certain circumstances the possibility, right, and obligation of civil disobedience must 
be understood to be open. 
The United States, during the past five years, has given 
birth lo new versions of very old issues in dramatizing 
such central questions as the bases of political obligation 
and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of civil disobedience. 
In Birmingham, while in prison, Martin Luther King 
wrote his Letter from Birmingham Jail in which he re-
stated the justification for deliberate disobedience of law; 
and in Berkeley, California, a similar problem was posed 
during the autumn of 1964 by leaders of the greatest 
student revolt of the present generation. At the same 
time, public officials seek to restate the duty to obey law, 
apparently without qualification. Thus, the late President 
Kennedy, in 1962. maintained that Americans were not 
free to choose the laws they should obey (N.Y. Times, 
1962: 22); and Senator Goldwater, in the campaign of 
1964, denounced those who, in his judgment, were con-
doning both direct action in general and civil disobedi-
ence in particular (N.Y. Times, 1964:12) . Recent ar-
ticles, moreover, have given a certain popularity to the 
issue (Bedau, I 961; Cohen, 1964; Frankel, 1964); and 
dry questions that a few years ago seemed to be appro-
priate only for desiccated professors of political philoso-
phy have suddenly taken on new life. 
There is, of course, a long tradition that may cast 
considerable light on the current discussion of political 
obligation and civil disobedience. This paper proposes to 
re-examine certain aspects of that tradition , to relate 
them to the contemporary debate, and to vindicate both 
the right and the obligation of civil disobedience. 
Three points are developed. First, the long-standing 
disquietude about the claims of the State to our obedi-
ence is examined . We seek to illustrate this by reference 
lo certain classical statements of St. Augustine, and to 
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adapt these statements to the uncertainties of others and 
to the language of our own day. Secondly, we remind 
ourselves of the various doctrines that, in light of the 
· disquietude, have been advanced to provide a basis for 
political obligation. Noting the merits and weaknesses 
of each, it is argued that no one of them furni shes an 
adequate foundation for political obligation. Thirdly , 
building upon the fact of uneasiness and such insights 
as are provided by the several accounts of obligation, 
the attempt is made to restate a basis for obligation and 
to develop criteria for judging when civil disobedience 
is legitimate. 
The Disquietude About Legitimacy 
The anxiety concerning legitimacy may be illustrated 
if we recall the dilemmas confronted by St. Augustine, 
the fifth-century Church Father, who sought to evaluate 
all political systems in terms of their justice . On the one 
hand, he conceived of a city of God , whose members 
are destined for salvation, who are pure in heart, and 
who are members of the heavenly city. On the other side 
are those condemned to spiritual death, who have turned 
away from God, and whose destiny is presumably hell. 
The cities or states of human history stand between the 
city of God and the city of the damned, since any given 
historical society will be composed of both tI1e saved and 
the condemned. Out of this commingling of heavenly and 
nonheavenly citizens arises political authority to provide 
a kind of uneasy peace pending the coming of the end 
of history, the elate of which no man knows and which 
may be imminent or remote in time. 
What puzzles Augustine - and presumably all those 
exercised about the issue of political obligation - is 
whether any distinction can be made between and among 
the types of political authority he has known or about 
which he has read. Are all of equal value and equally en-
titled to obedience? Or are some legitimate and others 
illegitimate? If so, how do we distinguish between the 
legitimate and the illegitimate? In Augustine's thinking, 
political authority did not exist in Eden but is the result 
of the necessity for coercion that accompanies the Fall 
of Man . Can distinctions be made between and among 
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historical soc1et1es, so that one feels a greater sense of 
obligation to some than to others - always keeping in 
mind that all grow out of wickedness? 
Augustine tried out two alternative answers (Bk. II, 
Ch . 21; Bk. IV., Ch. 4 ; Bk . XIX, Ch. 21, 23, and 24) . 
His first point of departure was Cicero's statement that 
a people is a multitude of men associated together by a 
common acknowledgment of right and a community of 
interests. Augustine interpreted "right" to mean "true 
justice. " And true justice includes not only giving to 
each man his due and to society what belongs to it, but 
also genuine worship of the one true God. Taking these 
requirements together, he concluded that there had been 
in reality no just society in history. Yet without justice, 
he asked, what is any kingdom but a great robbery? R e-
m ow Justitia quid regna nisi magna /atrocinia? From this 
point of view, no historic political society has satisfied the 
Augustinian criterion of legitimacy and, inferentially, our 
obligation to all such societies reaches the vanishing 
point. 
But he tended to withdraw in horror from what seems 
to be the logic of his position and he asked whether there 
may not be a more reasonable or, perhaps, usable defini-
tion of a people. He found the clue to his second con-
ception in the fact that while all historic political soci-
eties have been little better than "robberies," it is equally 
true that even robber bands have at least one of the char-
acteristics of Cicero's popu/us: They are associations of 
men united by the objects of their love and with rules for 
the distribution of spoils. Although they may not be just 
in terms of their ends, they do and must provide a cer-
tain ordering - if only to carry out robbery efficiently 
and to distribute the spoils according to regular rules -
and order is valuable regardless of its goals. At least, it 
is better than disorder. Or, as a modern scholar has put 
it, there is "law" even among the "outlaws." ( Merriam , 
1934: Ch. Ill). Every robber band, Augustine suggested , 
is a little kingdom and , contrariwise, every kingdom is 
an enlarged robber band. Both provide a measure of or-
der and, perhaps, this is about all we can expect in this 
world of fallen men. The implication of this view would 
seem to be that every well established power structure, 
since it at least establishes order, has a certain claim on 
our obedience . By contrast with his true justice test of 
legitimacy, Augustine's second-level definition would 
seem to open the way to a well nigh unqualified notion 
of obligation. And, indeed, he seemed to suggest pre-
cisely this: The only ground for disobedience is presum-
ably a specific Scriptural command ( Deane, 1963: 14 7, 
89, 90). 
Nor is St. Augustine the only great thinker to give evi-
dence of a profound uncertainty over the degree of legiti-
macy present in political societies. Although St. Thomas 
Aquinas seemed to think that even relatively bad gov-
ernments may be implicitly seeking good ends, he ap-
peared to imply the very mixed character of all political 
rule and he envisioned occasions on which men may 
have to consider disobedience. Luther was bothered by 
the contrast between the maxims of the Sermon on the 
Mount, on the one hand. and the apparent imperatives 
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of statecraft, on the other. Rousseau appeared to think: 
that most historic political authority has been - at least 
in considerable measure - simply a disguise for illegiti-
mate ends. As for the Marxist tradition, it is Augustin-
ian in its despair about any possibility of congruence be-
tween "justice" and historic states, but hopeful in its 
belief that the historic process itself will provide a ··solu-
tion" by wiping out all class-biased (and therefore un-
just) organizations. thus opening the way for a true mo-
rality . 
Obviously, the disquietude expressed by many think-
ers has a foundation in our actual experience. Govern-
ments that exist presumably to promote peace actually 
encourage war on a large scale ( Cook, J 962). Rulers 
established to help guarantee freedom tend to destroy it. 
Governing classes placed in control of the state machin-
ery by an originally democratic process become oli-
garchies and thus restrict or destroy the process . 
Under circumstances of this kind, can one wonder at 
Augustine's despair or be surprised by his tendency to 
state, in effect, that any kind of order must be obeyed, 
since it is at least an order? Can we escape his seeming 
conclusion that in effect all political societies are, relative 
to true justice, at about the same level, and that 1t 1s 
hopeless to differentiate between and among them with 
any certainty? 
Legitimacy and Obligation 
Despite this ubiquitous disquietude about the possibil-
ity of distinguishing political societies from one another. 
the tradition of political philosophy has obviously made 
some attempt to do so. 
The Naturalist View 
Perhaps the most persistent effort to construct a theory 
of political obligation has been that of what we might call 
the naturalists. Although there arc many rather diverse 
views included under this designation, they have in com-
mon the notion that man 's true ends can be rationally 
determined, can be separated from false ends , and can 
furnish a foundation for natural law whose precepts will 
provide grounds for distinguishing between legitimate and 
illegitimate rule. By this account, man is a polit1cal ani-
mal whose ends are naturally fulfilled only within a po-
litical society. That system of rule is binding, then. which 
conforms in its main outlines to the precepts of Nature 
conceived as a rationally discovered system of ends or 
goals. Beginning with such presumably self-evident prop-
ositions as that we should seek the good and avoid the 
evil, the naturalists then ask what the good for man may 
be held to be. Their answer turns on an examination of 
his natural needs, whether biological, social, or spiritual. 
From these needs they deduce such principles as that 
order is essential; that government is necessary for order; 
that legitimate government is that that enhances achieve-
ment of goals natural to man and discourages ends that 
are unnatural. The individual's obligation to obey posi-
tive law turns on the degree to which it expresses natural 
law, or at least does not contradict it. 
One difficulty with natural law conceptions in differ-
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entiating between legitimate and illegitmate systems of 
rule is that the distinction between natural and unnatural 
ends is not easy to determine. What is natural tends to be 
a function of the culture, and objective standards, where 
they may be held to exist, are ambiguous at best. ls the 
government of the United States legitimate, for example? 
The present Constitution was adopted by procedures that 
violated the law of the land at the time. Is not the ad-
monition to act according to positive law a principle of 
natural law? Why, under natural law principles, am I 
obliged to obey the Constitution? Some naturalists might 
say that because it has existed for a long time and has 
been generally obeyed, "prescription" makes the govern-
ment established under it legitimate, hence obligatory. 
But does this imply that anything old - e .g., the institu-
tion of war - carries with it the odor of moral sanctity 
simply because of that fact? This is simply one example 
of the many questions on which naturalist views seem to 
cast a light that is uncertain at best. 
Contract 
According to another pos1t1on, contract provides the 
!basis for obligation. Although many versions of the con-
tract theory have existed - among them those of Hobbes, 
Locke. Rousseau, for example - they have in common the 
notion that each of us has made an agreement with his 
fellows to obey a government - either under certain spe-
cified conditions and limitations ( as with Locke) or with-
out qualification. 
The objections to contract theories are numerous. 
When did members of the present generation contract 
with one another to obey the rules of a document drawn 
up in l 787? When did the British agree to obey the gov-
ernment of William the Conqueror - that "bastard" lead-
ing an .. mmed banditti," as Tom Paine used to call him -
after 1066? Even if we maintain that a given generation 
agrees to submit itself to political rule, why is this alleged 
contract binding on future generations who have made no 
such specific agreement? Nor does the doctrine of an im-
plicit consent stated by such thinkers as Socrates ( in Pla-
to's Criro) and Locke meet the issue, for by the time I 
have reached the age of discretion, I have been so condi-
tioned bv the culture and language of a nation that my 
decision to remain in that nation is hardly a free one. 
Yet another important question is whether we should 
regard the keeping of promises - a central value impera-
tive under contract theories - as the supreme value. To 
be sure, the principle that promises should be fulfilled is 
an important one, but it would seem doubtful that it 
ought to take precedence over all other considerations in 
making up one's mind about what is right at a given 
moment: and if one accept this notion, promises should 
be only one factor in making a decision on what is right. 
My promise can never be interpreted as one committing 
me t-0 obey under all circumstances and regardless of my 
sense of right at a particular time. 
Utility 
Some have asserted that obligation might be based on 
utility. If the government promotes more pleasure than 
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pain, said the nineteenth-century utilitarians, and assum-
ing that pleasure is equivalent to "good" and pain to 
"evil," then I am obliged to obey, since it is to my inter-
est to do so. The great merit of a utilitarian view is that 
it attempts to make less vague such often rationalizing 
formulae as "vital interests" and "general welfare." On 
the other hand, it is obvious that even a utilitarian 
scheme must begin with propositions not derived from 
utility; and since "obligation" tends to be identified with 
"interest," the problem of obligation, as Carritt has 
pointed out (Carritt, 1935), is really evaded or ignored. 
Organicism 
Organicist positions have something in common with 
naturalist statements but need not put their viewpoint in 
terms of a natural law. ln the tradition stemming from 
Rousseau and Hegel, and embracing, to some extent, 
such thinkers as Green, the general will of the moral 
community binds me because it is the true or real will 
of myself. Thus I am obliged to obey because I have a 
moral duty to transcend the limitations of my "empirical" 
self and to release the "true self" that is struggling to be 
born-a self, purged of egoism, that understands that only 
obedience to the general will can make for moral prog-
ress. My empirical self, which operates in terms of self-
interest, can be transcended only by being constantly re-
minded through law of the unselfish being that is con-
stantly at war with it. Out of this conflict arises the dis-
tinction between mere "interest" and "obligation." The 
former means unlimited freedom to express my present 
self, the latter the freedom to do what I ought in terms 
of my rational self. 
There are many difficulties with the organicist posi-
tion; among them is the problem of discovering the iden-
tity of the true self. This problem is similar to the ques-
tion confronted by the naturalist when he attempts to 
find out the meaning of right reason or the ends of Na-
ture. Does the law of every historical state, for example 
- no matter what its contents may be - automatically 
identify my true self? The historical state notoriously re-
flects compromise and clashing economic interests. In 
what sense, then, can it be said to speak for my true or 
moral self? 
Evaluation of Views 
The upshot of all this is that all traditional accounts 
of the basis of political obligation are inadequate in one 
or more respects. At the same time, if we do not push 
them too far, each of them gives us an insight into the 
complexity of treating obligation, and each, moreover, 
points up one aspect of the problem. Naturalist views 
surely reflect an important desideratum for any doctrine 
of legitimacy- a nonarbitrary, nonconventional set of 
standards by which we can judge political authority. Con-
tract positions dramatize the notion that authority to be 
binding must repose on consent as well as embody the 
morally defensible statements stressed by the natural-
ist. Utilitarian views warn us against taking refuge in 
such unsatisfactory and vague expressions as "national 
interest" or "national honor." Finally, organicist ideas 
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rightly stress the social and political dimensions of what 
we call "personality" and, therefore, the unreality of 
completely discrete "individuals." 
An adequate theory of obligation will have to take ac-
count of both the strengths and the weaknesses embodied 
in the several traditional views. 
Disquietude, Obligation and Civil Disobedience 
Having now suggested the anxiety about political so-
ciety and having summarized important attempts to pro-
vide an adequate foundation for political obligation, I 
turn, in this last section, to (a) a restatement of the is-
sue of political obligation that will take account of both 
Augustine's dilemma and the weaknesses and strengths 
in the several analyses of obligation, and ( b) a justifi-
cation. under certain circumscribed conditions, of civil 
disobedience. 
Restatement of the Issue 
A theory of obligation requires, first, a delineation of 
what a fully legitimate authority would be; second, a 
similar sketch of an ideal-type illegitimate ruler; and 
third, judgment of all historical authorities by standards 
arising out of our standards of legitimacy and illegiti-
macy. Our obligation is greatest to those alleged authori-
ties that endeavor by their actions to approximate legiti-
macy, and least to those that appear to forget the criteria 
of moral licitness. 
From the viewpoint of this paper-and of an important 
t~a_dition in Western political thought-a completely le-
g1t1mate authority is one that exists in a society that has 
reconciled our consciousness of individuality with our 
feeling of belonging to others. In such a society-envi-
sioned in greater or lesser degree by such thinkers as St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, Marx, Engels, and Lenin-
each person would be free and spontaneous and yet 
wourd be associated with his fellows for collective en-
deavors. The order demanded when men mingle with 
one another would not find itself in tension with person-
aJities that have ends beyond the social order. 
In a perfectly legitimate society, it would seem, the 
coordinating machinery of the society, so necessary 
when men become specialized in their tasks, would pri-
marily administer " things," as the Marxist communist 
version would have it. Direct coercion of men, and par-
ticularly the utilization of physical force, would vanish. 
Law would become, in Emerson's pregnant words, a 
mere ''memorandum"; and once individual personalities 
read the words of the memorandum, they would see im-
mediately the legitimacy of its prescriptions. Law ··mak-
ing" itself would be the end result of a consensus-oath-
. b 
enng process, with formal voting reduced to the vanish-
ing point. The pull of special economic interests would 
have been abolished through common ownership and 
administration of resources, and distribution in accord-
ance with need (a need that each self-disciplined individ-
ual would determine). Taxation as we know it today 
would have vanished, since collective necessities would 
be supplied from the total product before individual dis-
tribution could take place. Armies would, of course, be 
no more. Complete freedom of expression would obtain. 
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Under conditions of this kind. in other words. author-
ity would, so to speak, be fully authoritative and would 
carry its own "power." Vera jus1i1ia-true justice-would 
obtain. 
If, now, one were to imagine an ideal type illegitimate 
system of political relations, one need only spell out the 
reverse of the picture of legitimacy. The coordinating 
machinery of society woul'd manipulate men for its own 
ends in such a way that they would not even be aware of 
their own exploitation. If perchance they resisted, force 
without stint would be applied, sometimes without even 
the pretense of using forms of law. Law and principles 
of morality would be determined completely by the rul-
ing classes, any distinction between right and might be-
ing eliminated. Threats of various kinds would keep the 
population cowed and submissive. Law would be im-
posed with no explanation of the reasons supporting it. 
Armies would, of course, play an important role, one 
road to political power being success in military intimi-
dation. Spontaneity would be discouraged in every way, 
even in the realms of sport and recreation. 
This dichotomization between legitimate and illegiti-
mate is obviously based on a particular view of what the 
conception of humanity implies by way of social order-
ing, and in this respect the notion of legitimacy is di-
rectly connected with those perspectives that earlier were 
termed naturalist-in the sense that legitimacy implies a 
situation in which man's true nature has been fulfilJed. 
But there are also elements of the contractual, insofar as 
consent becomes a fully developed and genuine ingredi-
ent in political relations. Utilitarian ideas are relevant, 
too, at least to the degree that authority would necessar-
ily have to appeal to judgments about consequences and 
would have to define objectives in concrete terms. Fi-
nally, organicist conceptions are mirrored in the over-
coming of the alienation of men from their fellov.s . 
Just as Augustine's first definition of a commonwealth 
emphasized the fact that no historical society is fully le-
gitimate, so does my formulation maintain the highly 
mixed and morally ambiguous character of all past and 
present regimes. Every political system is partly robbery 
and piracy and yet it is also, in terms of Augustine's 
second definition, some kind of order that ,ve deem val-
uable . At best, any given historical scheme can be justi-
fied only relatively and our obligation is only a r-:lative 
or conditional one. 
What criteria can we discover for distinguishing be-
tween relatively legitimate and relatively illegitimate re-
gimes? 
We might see an answer , first , in terms of the proced-
ures whereby decisions are reached and, second. in rela-
tion to the substance of the decisions themselve~ . 
With respect to procedures, any claimed authority that 
closes avenues to the enhancement of its legitimacy 
would seem to be attacking the principle of authority at 
its roots. Thus any quasi-authority that cuts oft criti-
cisms, reduces freedom of expression, or deliberately 
withholds information is undermining the basic founda-
tions in that it is denying the means for nonviolent 
change in the direction of greater legitimacy. Other pro-
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cedural values are scarcely less important, and for the 
same reason: among these are reasonably nonarbitrary 
procedures in criminal and civil courts and the absence 
of too wide a discretion in the sphere allocated to the ex-
ecutive . In general , any serious denial of the rule of law 
subjects a regime to the charge of too great a degree of 
illegitimacv. 
fr the f~amework allows change and progress in the 
direction of full authority, then the substance of many 
decisions can be tolerated, if not fully approved, on 
grounds either that they are ethically neutral or that, 
given the actual conditions obtaining, they may be rela-
tively justified. Thus, under conditions of perfect legiti-
macy, physical coercion would disappear. Within the rel-
ativities of history, however, some coercion under certain 
specific circumstances might be regarded as supportable. 
But some decisions would seem to be ruled out in a 
virtuallv absolute sense. Thus the deliberate and pre-
meditated taking of life under the guise of "authority" 
would appear to be beyond the pale. This prohibition of 
deliberate killing might be said to derive from the notion 
that a central function of authority is to enhance life and 
not to destroy it. In particular circumstances, to be sure, 
we might well be uncertain as to what constitutes delib-
erate and premeditated taking of life as against acci-
dental or unintended killing; but surely capital punish-
ment and war would be ruled out, at a minimum. 
Then. too, a high substantative priority would be a 
property system that assures a livelihood for all, even 
though distribution of economic power might be far from 
the norms of pure legitimacy. The property question as-
sumes high-order priority because of its close relation to 
the objective of enhancing life. 
The~e. then, are among the most significant of the 
procedural and substantive values, the denial of which 
by the quasi-authorities of history would seem to reduce 
political obligation to the vanishing point and open the 
way for morally legitimate civil disobedience. Having 
sketched out ideal-type legitimacy and illegitimacy and 
their adaptation to the relativities of history, the princi-
ples under which civil disobedience may be justified can 
now be spelled out. 
Justification of Civil Disobedience 
Those who would support civil disobedience, we sug-
gest, must act with a sense of responsibility, give the 
benefit of the doubt to the Jaw, be fairly certain that basic 
norms of procedure and substance have been violated, 
disobey overtly rather than covertly, act nonviolently , 
and recognize that the individual himself, rather than a 
group, has the right and obligation to decide when civil 
disobedience is required. 
Responsibility. By responsibility is meant that the pur-
pose and possible consequences of the proposed civil 
disobedience must be carefully weighed before the deci-
sion is made. Thus mere impulse must be ruled out as 
incompatible with rational human action. 
Benefit of the Doubt. Fully admitting that any given 
legal and political system is a mixture of the aspiration 
for legitimacy and an attack on legitimacy, the benefit of 
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any doubt, it would seem, should be given to the existing 
law or decree. This is because we can share with Augus-
tine the view that the value of order - any kind of order, 
or, in other terms, any system of mutual expectations-is 
so great that unless the system can be shown to be grave-
ly deficient in its moral underpinnings, it must be as-
sumed to have a certain claim, however bastardized . 
Norms of Procedure and Substance Violated. In de-
ciding whether the presumption of obligation to obey is 
to be overthrown, reference should be made to the no-
tion of legitimacy suggested earlier, both in its ideal-typi-
cal form and in its adaptation to the exigencies and rela-
tivities of the historical situation . First of all, one should 
give primary weight to procedures and to the notion of 
rank ordering of values in the procedural framework. A 
system of rule that disregards the basic norms of even 
relative authority is contradicting its implicit purpose, 
which is, let us repeat, a more solidly based authority 
from the moral point of view. Similarly, to the extent 
that the basic substance of decisions contradicts the ends 
for which quasi-authorities are established, to that de-
gree does claimed authority cease to be morally obliga-
tory, even in a relative sense. 
Thus when alleged authority silences a man through 
intimidation, takes a life in war, kills a person under the 
guise of punishment, or deprives human beings of liveli-
hoods through an inadequate property system, it thereby 
undermines its own authority and correspondingly weak-
ens its claims on my obedience. After a certain point has 
been reached, if I do obey it will he because of sheer ex-
pediency and not by virtue of a sense of obligation. 
It was considerations of this kind that led Martin Lu-
ther King, in 1963, to violate court orders forbidding him 
to protest segregation (King, 1963: 7); that impelled 
students at the University of California to occupy build-
ings in violation of law; and that often send the conscien-
tious objector to jail for refusing to register under the 
conscription law. 
Overt, Not Covert Disobedience. It is precisely be-
cause the civilly disobedient take seriously their political 
obligation that they feel impelled to violate the law de-
liberatefy and overtly. They make public announcement 
of it, accept responsibility, and stand ready to suffer the 
consequences in terms of a penalty. They disobey be-
cause they value law and deem the rule they are violat-
ing to be either no law ( the natural law view) or bad 
law ( the positivist position). Although they recognize 
that no alleged law can be fuUy authoritative in the 
mixed world characteristic of history, they insist that it 
must meet certain minimum requirements lest it destroy 
its very raison d'etre. They thus vindicate the principle 
of law in the very act of violating a particular command. 
Non-Violence. The disobedience must not only be 
overt but also nonviolent. One cannot consistently pro-
test against the undermining of authority by the histori-
cal state and, at the same time, utilize violence in the 
process. For violence runs counter to the idea of moral 
authority, it denigrates human personality, and, in effect, 
it subverts the foundations of the order to which I am 
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appealing as a civilly disobedient person. Thus violent 
revolution tends to be self defeating, destroying the 
foundations of moral order while it claims to be seeking 
a more nearly legitimate authority. When violence is 
used to secure revolutionary change, it is as illegitimate 
and therefore as unauthoritative as the violence of a war 
waged by the quasi-authorities of history. 
Decision by the Individual. In deciding whether to be 
disobedient, the individual in the end must be guided by 
his own conscience. 
Some thinkers, to be sure, are dissatisfied with conclu-
sions of this kind, protesting that the individual cannot 
and must not determine when he should and should not 
obey. Typical of these critics is Dr. Will Herberg, who 
wrote: 
Every man has his conscience; and if the individ-
ual conscience is absolutized ( that is, divinized), 
and made the final judge of laws to be obeyed or 
disobeyed, nothing but anarchy and the dissolution 
of the very fabric of government would result (Na-
tional Review, 1964, p. 580). 
In response to such objections, we might well remind 
ourselves that "conscience" originally meant "joint 
knowledge" and that in considerable measure it still has 
this connotation. One's conscience about a particular 
matter is developed within a social context , is nourished 
by constant testing against the views of others, is not the 
product of mere impulse, and is animated by a sense of 
responsibility both to humanity and to oneself. Both nat-
uralist and organicist views would stress this conception; 
and some versions even of contractualist and utilitarian 
positions would not dissent. In other words, the con-
science cannot be regarded as the vain subjective ghost 
of some mythical discrete individual. 
We might also ask who should make the decision, if 
not the individual person . Where would Dr. Herberg 
turn? To the church? But which church? And how can 
we assume that the church is a better judge of matters of 
right and wrong than the individual? To the state? But 
would the historical state ever advise us to break its 
laws? And how can we differentiate the state from Au-
gustine's band of robbers without appealing to an au-
thority beyond the state? Would Dr. Herberg have rec-
ognized Hitler's state as authoritative? If not, whose 
judgment, if not his own, would he have accepted? 
There would seem to be no alternative to the individ-
ual conscience. Informed and carefully examined, it must 
be the final judge of civil disobedience, as of other mat-
ters , Even if it be in error, it must still be followed , as 
St. Thomas Aquinas has so persuasively argued (Sum-
ma, First Part of 11, Q. IX, Art. 5; Quodlibet, 27). 
As for the charge of anarchy, it has been the burden 
of this paper to maintain that any legal or political sys-
tem is far safer in the hands of those who obey or dis-
obey law on conscientious grounds-and with a more or 
less conscious doctrine of obligation in the background 
-than it is in the custody of those who either obey or 
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disobey law without thought and without cnt1c1sm. An 
historical order reposing on conscience may have ele-
ments of durability; but one bottomed on unreflective 
obedience and impulsive disobedience can be swept away 
by whim and happenstance. Possible civil disobedience 
is the price we pay for an order resting, in part at least, 
on awareness that an historical regimes are in some 
degree illegitimate and may have to be resisted. But 
this price is far less than the moral and social charge 
assessed when we assume that all alleged law must be 
automatically obeyed; for automatic obedience implies 
automatons in the guise of men-a denial of the aspira-
tion for autonomy and moral authority, which is the 
most distinctive quality of humanity. 
In our day particularly, with its arge-scale manipula-
tion of human beings, the civilly disobedient may not 
only vindicate their own personal integrity but also ren-
der a genuine social service. They vividly remind us that 
all power tends to corrupt ; that shock techniques are 
needed to recall so-called democracies to their own prin-
ciples; that elites often become both stupid and immoral; 
and, to recur to St. Augustine, that only a relatively thin 
line may separate the ruler claiming political authority 
from the pirate chief. 
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